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Justice Antonin Scalia and Criminal
Justice Cases
By CHRISTOPHER E. SMrI*
INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the United States
Supreme Court underwent a dramatic shift in its composition.
Republican Presidents Reagan and Bush had the opportunity
to replace five retiring justices with appointees Sandra Day
O'Connor,' Antonin Scalia, 2 Anthony Kennedy, 3 David
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Akron. A.B. 1980, Harvard
University; M.Sc. 1981, University of Bristol (England); J.D. 1984, University of Tennessee;
Ph.D. 1988, University of Connecticut.
I am grateful for the assistance of Scott P. Johnson of The Ohio State University and
Linda Fry, Brigette Nunn, and William Smith of the University of Akron.
I For example, while O'Connor's predecessor, Justice Potter Stewart, authored an
important civil rights precedent that recognized the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for
congressional power to forbid discrimination by private entities, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), O'Connor joined the other conservatives in seeking reconsideration
of congressional power to regulate private discriminatory conduct. See Stuart Taylor, Court,
5-4, Votes to Restudy Rights in Minority Suits, N.Y. Tmoa, Apr. 26, 1988, at Al. O'Connor
ultimately joined a five-member majority that preserved, but sharply narrowed, the construc-
tion of a Thirteenth Amendment-based statute against discrimination. See Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The Court's decision was ultimately reversed by congres-
sional enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which clarified and broadened protections
against discrimination by private entities. Andrew Rosenthal, Reaffirming Commitment, Bush
Signs Rights Bill, N.Y. Ta.m, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al, All.
2 Chief Justice Warren Burger endorsed affirmative action by the federal government
that reserved contracts for minority business enterprises in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980), but the justice appointed upon Burger's retirement, Antonin Scalia, has been a
consistent critic of affirmative action both before and after his appointment to the Supreme
Court. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WAsH. U. L.Q. 147 (written long before
his Supreme Court appointment); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,
480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Mhe only losers in the [affirmative action]
process are the [white males] of the country.... The irony is that these individuals-
predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized-suffer this injustice at the hands of a
Court fond of thinking itself the champion of the politically impotent.").
3Although Justice Lewis Powell provided support for both abortion rights, see City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,420-21 n.l (1983), and affirmative
action, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), his successor, Anthony
Kennedy, has joined, see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), or
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Souter, 4 and Clarence Thomas 5 who generally have more con-
servative judicial philosophies than their predecessors.6 The al-
tered composition of the Supreme Court has led to significant
authored opinions critical of the Supreme Court's decisions supporting both issues. See Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3044 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
4 Justice William Brennan, "the leading liberal Justice," Linda Greenhouse, Brennan,
Key Liberal, Quits Supreme Court; Battle for Seat Likely, N.Y. Tnsas, July 21, 1990, at Al,
A7, was replaced by David Souter, whose first term performance on the Supreme Court made
clear that he "quickly became a supportive member of the contemporary Court's conservative
majority." Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Newcomer on the High Court: Justice
David Souter and the Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 37 S.D. L. Rnv. 21, 29 (1992). During
his first term, Souter provided the decisive fifth vote in seven criminal justice decisions against
the assertions of individuals' rights decisions that surely would have gone the other way if
Brennan had still been on the Court. See id. at 29-31; Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991)
(testing constitutionality of conditions within prisons according to subjective standard assessing
officials' intentions, rather than objective assessment of the conditions themselves); Harmelin
v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (finding no constitutional proportionality problems when
state applies mandatory life-without-parole sentence for first time offender convicted of
possessing 650 grams of cocaine because such punishment is not cruel and unusual in consti-
tutional sense); Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991) (allowing no reversal on due process
grounds for trial judge's failure to instruct jury on lesser included offenses in capital case);
Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991) (finding no Article III problem when, despite
the absence of specific statutory authority, U.S. magistrate judges conduct voir dire for felony
juries when defendants consent); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, Ill S. Ct. 1661 (1991)
(finding no constitutional violation when arrestees are held in jail for 48 hours prior to an
appearance before a magistrate for a determination of probable cause to pursue charges if
such proceedings are held as soon as reasonably feasible); Mu'min v. Virginia, Ill S. Ct.
1899 (1991) (holding defendant's right to fair trial not violated when judge refused to question
jurors during voir dire about specific contents of news reports to which they had been exposed);
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (holding that a coerced confession may be
"harmless error" that does not require new trial).
The newest justice, Clarence Thomas, has yet to establish a clear decisional pattern
on the Court, but his public statements indicate that he will be more conservative than his
predecessor, Thurgood Marshall. See Maureen Dowd, Conservative Black Judge, Clarence
Thomas, Is Named to Marshall's Court Seat, N.Y. Tmm, July 2, 1991, at Al, A15 ("Judge
Thomas, who has risen in Republican ranks as an advocate of bootstrap conservatism, would
present a striking change from Justice Marshall, a civil rights pioneer and an anchor of the
Court's declining liberal faction."). In criminal justice cases during his initial term, Justice
Thomas stood out as the most conservative of all the justices by writing strong dissenting
opinions opposing the majority's decisions to permit a prisoner who was beaten by guards to
allege Eighth Amendment violations, see Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992), and to
permit a new trial for an escaped convict whose death penalty may have been influenced by
irrelevant information about his membership in the racist Aryan Brotherhood prisoner organ-
ization. See Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). In Hudson, Thomas's position was
even more conservative than that of the Bush Administration, which had "joined prisoners'
rights groups in urging the Justices to overturn the 1990 [circuit court] ruling." Linda
Greenhouse, High Court Defines New Limit on Force By a Prison Guard, N.Y. Tmm, Feb.
26, 1992, at Al, A16.
6 See Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court in Transition: Assessing the Legitimacy
of the Leading Legal Institution, 79 Ky. L.J. 317, 318-19 nn.3-5 (1990-91).
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changes in decisions affecting controversial issues7 such as abor-
tion,8 freedom of religion, 9 and affirmative action.'0 Not surpris-
ingly, the Supreme Court's emerging conservative majority,
usually composed of the recent appointees plus incumbents Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Byron White, has made
(and continues to make) a variety of changes in judicial decisions
affecting the criminal justice system."
Although Justice Antonin Scalia is the only recent appointee
who replaced a thoroughly conservative justice (Chief Justice Warren
Burger), Scalia's presence on the Court has not been merely a
continuation of a dependable conservative vote. Scalia has been
described as the Court's "most provocative justice' '1 2 because of his
strongly-held views and strident, influential opinions. Unlike his
immediate predecessor, Chief Justice Burger, who was sometimes
criticized for his inability to provide intellectual influence over the
Court's opinions,'" Scalia has quickly become renowned for his
See generally Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Emerging Majority: Re-
straining the High Court or Transforming Its Role?, 24 AxaoN L. REv. 393 (1990) (illustrating
the position that the Supreme Court's contemporary conservative majority engages in "judicial
activism" by quickly altering precedents concerning a variety of issues).
I See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (approving
statement that "life begins at conception" in state statute that regulated the performance of
abortions by doctors and public hospitals).
9 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (holding that right to free exercise of religion does not excuse individual from obeying
state laws regulating behavior).
,0 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that
city and state governments may not implement affirmative action in public contracting unless
they can demonstrate that they were guilty of discriminatory acts in need of remedy).
" The reduction of the scope of constitutional protections for criminal defendants and
prisoners that began during the Burger Court era and has continued through the Rehnquist
Court era is attributable to both the conservative philosophical orientations of recent Supreme
Court appointees and increased skepticism among the justices about the continued risks of
misbehavior by criminal justice officials. See Christopher E. Smith, Police Professionalism
and the Rights of Criminal Defendants, 26 Cma. L. BtLL. 155 (1990).
," David A. Kaplan and Bob Cohn, The Court's Mr. Right: Scalia Can Call a Tune,
But Who Will Follow?, N-wswEEc, Nov. 5, 1990, at 62, 67.
,1 One apparent reason for Burger's limited impact on the Court's decisions was
an absence of the skills needed for effective leadership. A former clerk for
Justice Powell said that Burger "does not have the gift of leadership or concil-
iation." Burger was accused of bullying the Court and of attempting to control
decisions through illegitimate means. According to one Justice, "all too damned
often the Chief Justice will vote with the majority so as to assign the opinion,
and then he ends up in dissent." Some colleagues reacted negatively to [Burger's]
efforts at leadership.
LAWRENCE BAuM, THE SuPRnmi COURT 165 (4th ed. 1992) (citations omitted).
1992-93]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
innovative thinking and influential opinions.' 4 Scalia is often influ-
ential even when his views do not immediately prevail with a ma-
jority on the Court: "[Scalia's] willingness to discard accepted rules
and refashion them in light of his own constitutional vision made
his impact greater than his rather low success rate [as the author of
majority opinions] might suggest."' 5
Soon after Scalia was appointed, one leading legal scholar iden-
tified Scalia and Rehnquist as potential leaders in any Rehnquist
Court effort to reverse the precedents established during the Warren
Court era: "The powerful impact and considerable persuasiveness
of Rehnquist and Scalia may have an important impact on unknown
future justices."' 16 Now that these "future justices"-Kennedy, Sou-
ter and Thomas-are participating in Supreme Court decisions, it is
especially important to assess Scalia's impact. This Article will dis-
cuss Scalia's participation in cases affecting criminal justice issues,
as well as his relevant opinions. Because he is such an influential
voice on the contemporary Court, it is useful to examine how the
themes in his judicial opinions affect criminal justice issues and how
he has decided such issues since his appointment to the Court in
1986.
I. TRENDS AND VOTING PATrERNS
A. From the Warren Court to the Rehnquist Court
The Warren Court made a significant impact on the criminal
justice system by interpreting the Bill of Rights in new ways that
provided greater protection for criminal defendants and convicted
offenders. As described by one scholar:
" Justice Scalia "possesses a judicial philosophy and political vision that extend far
beyond simple allegiance to a few policy positions.... [I]t is a vision that limits the checking
function of the Court in constitutional politics, enhances legislative and executive and agency
power, and subjects rights to definition by the majority in control of government." Richard
A. Brisbin, Jr., The Conservatism ofAntonin Scalia, 105 PoL. Sci. Q. 1, 29 (1990). Scalia's
assertiveness in advancing his views in opinions is unique on the contemporary Court: "Scalia
in his first three years on the Court wrote between fifteen and nineteen concurring opinions
each year, more than any other justice." DAVID M. O'BRIEN, SToRm CENTER: THE SUPREME
CoURT mN AMmcAN PoLmcs 317 (2d ed. 1990).
1 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Dissenters: Loners or Pioneers?, N.Y. TIMEs, July
20, 1990, at B7.
26 Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three
Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS: RioHTS AND WRONGS iN no SUPREaME
COURT, 1969-1986, 167 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1988).
[VoL. 81
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Between 1961 and 1969 the Warren Court accomplished what
previous courts had stoutly resisted: it applied virtually all the
procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the states' adminis-
tration of criminal justice.... The result was a nationalized Bill
of Rights that dimmed the local character of justice by applying
the same restraints to all criminal proceedings, both state and
federal.' 7
Supreme Court decisions of this era affected the policies and prac-
tices of law enforcement agencies' and courts alike. 19
During the 1970s, President Richard Nixon responded to the
perception that the Court had gone too far in protecting criminal
defendants and in interfering with criminal justice agencies20 by
attempting to appoint new justices who would take a narrower view
of constitutional rights. For example, Warren Burger was nominated
to be Chief Justice specifically because Nixon expected that Burger
would implement the President's goal of "law and order" judicial
policies.2' Although Nixon appointed four justices (Burger, Black-
mun, Rehnquist, and Powell) who were initially more conservative
than their predecessors,2 "contrary to expectations, there was no
1 DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAiR TRIAL: THE RIGHTS oF AccusED IN AmERiCAN HISTORY
113 (1992).
," See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that police must inform
suspects of their rights upon arrest); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (upholding application
of "exclusionary rule" to improper searches and seizures by state and local police).
1, See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring states to provide
counsel for indigent criminal defendants facing possible felony incarceration).
" Nixon's acceptance speech when he became the Republican presidential nominee
focused on the problems of law and order:
And tonight it's time for some honest talk about the problem of order in
the United States. Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who
serve on them, but let us also recognize that some of our courts in their decisions
have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces
in this country.
Let those who have the responsibility to enforce our laws, and our judges
who have the responsibility to interpret them, be dedicated to the great principles
of civil rights. But let them also recognize that the first civil right of every
American is to be free from domestic violence. And that right must be guar-
anteed in this country.
Richard M. Nixon, Acceptance Speech (August 8, 1968), reprinted in LEE EPs=an & THo.tAs
G. WALKER, CONSnUoNAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMuCA RiGHTs, LmERTIEs, AND JusTICE
335 (1992).
21 HENRY J. ABRArm,, Jusncas AND PansESNims: A POimrTcAL HIsTORY OF AppoiNr-
mENTs TO Tm SupREm COURT 297-98 (2d ed. 1985).
2 For example, Earl Warren presided over the Court during the era in which it made
many landmark decisions concerning the rights of criminal defendants, while his successor,
Warren Burger, sought to remove the judiciary from involvement with policy-shaping decisions
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
counterrevolution in the law governing defendants' rights. Upon
Burger's retirement in 1986, the major criminal procedure decisions
of the Warren Court era remained essentially intact." 3 During the
Burger Court era (1969-1986), the justices narrowed some protections
for criminal defendants2 and declined to expand established rights,2
but they did not erase landmark decisions.
that would affect law enforcement agencies and other governmental entities:
Revealing differences between Warren and Burger emerged in separate
public interviews each man gave, coincidentally, two years after assuming the
chief justiceship. In 1955 Warren maintained that the Court had a crucial
responsibility to renew and fulfill the highest ideals of the Constitution, most
notably the expressions of justice found in the Bill of Rights.... A more
specific concern was reforming criminal process, a system riddled with "proce-
dural flaws and anachronisms," to achieve truly equal justice under law.
Burger in 1971 saw a more limited role for the Court. The justices sat
simply to decide cases, not to make rules or create new law.... Significantly,
the Bill of Rights merited not a word in the interview.
D. BODENHAMER, supra note 17, at 129-30 (citations omitted).
Harry Blackmun was appointed by Nixon to fill the seat vacated by the resignation of
Justice Abe Fortas, a justice whose decisional patterns placed him in "an extremely cohesive
bloc" with fellow liberals Earl Warren, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall. STEPHEN
L. WASBY, TiE SuPREma COURT IN Tim FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYsTEM 250 (3d ed. 1988). Blackmun
initially decided cases in a consistently conservative manner, joining, for example, Chief Justice
Burger "in 90 percent of the 1970 Term's nonunanimous cases and in all but one criminal
procedure case." Id. Later during the 1970s, and particularly after he became subject to
attacks by conservatives because of his opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Blackmun
joined the Court's liberals with increasing frequency. See ABaPAHAm, supra note 21, at 304-05.
William Rehnquist replaced Justice John Harlan. Although Harlan was a moderate
member of the Warren Court who urged judicial restraint, "he would not stand for govern-
mental shortcuts in the name of law and order. Thus, practices such as wiretapping and
eavesdropping, illegal invasions of human privacy, incursions on freedom of expression, and
racial segregation met his determined opposition." Id. at 261. In contrast, Rehnquist was
"ideologically even to the right of Nixon [and] Burger.... [and was] a vocal critic of the
Warren Court's posture on criminal justice, a confirmed law-and-order man, [and] a devoted
supporter of strong national security." Id. at 315. Rehnquist's conservative judicial philosophy
has made him less likely than any other justice to support assertions of constitutional rights
by individuals. See infra note 28 and accompanying table. See also Sun DAvis, JUsTIcE
REHNQUIST AND Tm CoNsTITUToN (1988) (analyzing Rehnqulst's decisions to show that he
rarely supports individual claimants in nonunanimous cases).
During much of the Warren Court era, Justice Hugo Black was a consistent member of
the liberal majority coalition. WAsBy, supra, at 250. His successor, Lewis Powell, however,
was "[c]autious and conservative, yet moderate and nondoctrinaire by inclination and com-
mitment .... comfortable in the Court's center." ABRAmAM, supra note 21, at 309.
23 ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 309.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (explaining "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (finding "public
safety" exception to requirement of Miranda warnings).
See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (holding that double-celling does
not constitute unconstitutional overcrowding in prisons designed with single-person cells); Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (finding no constitutional right to counsel for indigent
defendants facing only fines for minor offenses).
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"judicial activism7' is most pronounced in the alteration of estab-
lished precedents affecting such issues as employment discrimination 26
and abortion.27 As this Article demonstrates, however, the Rehnquist
era majority has also accelerated the pace of change by altering and
refining decisions affecting criminal justice issues.-
B. Rehnquist Court Decisional Patterns and Opinion Authorship
How has Justice Scalia participated in the Court's Rehnquist era
criminal justice decisions? As Table 1 indicates, 21 Scalia has consis-
tently joined the other conservative justices as a dependable vote
against assertions of rights by criminal defendants and prisoners.
Table 1: Percentage of Justices' Decisions Against Individuals
in Nonunanimous Criminal Justice Cases, 1986-1992
Decisions Against Individuals
Number in which the
Justice Percentage Justice Participated
Rehnquist 91% (163)
Scalia 86 (163)
Powell 79 ( 39)
Kennedy 78 (111)
O'Connor 78 (163)
White 77 (163)
Thomas 75 ( 20)
Souter 69 (49)
Blackmun 35 (163)
Stevens 24 (163)
Brennan 9 (110)
Marshall 6 (140)
26 After the appointment of Justice Kennedy tipped the balance of power on the Supreme
Court in favor of the conservatives, the newly-solidified five-member conservative majority
acted sua sponte to limit the scope of racial discrimination suits seeking damages for racial
harassment in the execution of employment contracts. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164 (1989); see also Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and Ethnicity, 69
OR. L. Rnv. 797, 823-36 (1990).
" In Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), "[Justices] Scalia,
Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy indicated that they [were] prepared to reverse the [sixteen-
year-old Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)] precedent as soon as they secure[d] the needed
fifth vote." See Smith, The Supreme Court in Transition, supra note 6, at 340.
Figures tabulated and calculated by author from cases reported in Supteme Court
Reporter, 1986 through 1992.
1992-93]
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Despite the consistency of Scalia's voting pattern on criminal
justice issues, he does not necessarily vote in a "lock-step" fashion
with other conservatives in every case. Subsequent sections of this
Article will show that Scalia's independent views lead him to disagree
with his conservative colleagues and to join the liberal justices in
cases concerning particular issues. Even when he shares the other
conservatives' views about the proper outcomes for cases, Scalia
frequently distinguishes his views from those of his conservative
colleagues by writing concurring opinions.
As the presentation in Table 229 of justices' relative productivity
in writing opinions illustrates,30 the magnitude of Scalia's impact
upon the Court is due in large part to his eagerness to assert his
viewpoints in concurring and dissenting opinions. The average num-
ber of opinions authored by Scalia during the 1990 and 1991 terms,
41.5, was exceeded only by the 46 of Justice John Paul Stevens.
Significantly, most of Stevens' opinions were dissents, and it is
apparent that, as one of the remaining liberal justices, Stevens is
defending the.precedents that he sees being narrowed or eliminated
by the Court's conservative majority. In contrast, by writing twice
as many concurring opinions as any other justice, Scalia is obviously
attempting to explain his viewpoints in order to clarify the way he
differs from his conservative colleagues in analyzing issues. As Table
2 further illustrates, Scalia also enjoys the distinction of being the
only justice to have written more concurring than dissenting opinions
during the 1990 and 1991 terms. Thus, more than most other
justices, Scalia consciously seeks to shape the Court's reasoning by
meticulously delineating his judicial views even while agreeing with
the result reached by the majority.3'
29 See Table 2 infra p. 195.
"Figures tabulated by author from cases reported in Supreme Court Reporter, 1990
Term. See Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, David Souter's First Term on the
Supreme Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75 JUDICATURE 238, 241-42 (1992) (discussing
analytical methodology and opinion authorship patterns on the Supreme Court during the
1990 Term).
1, See O'BREEN, supra note 14, at 316 ("Justices usually write separate concurring
opinions to explain how the Court's decision could have been otherwise rationalized....
Concurring opinions may be required because of a 'greater institutional interest in the forth-
rightness of differing justices' views."') (citation omitted).
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Table 2: Average Number of Opinions Authored,
1990 and 1991 Terms
Total
Majority Majority Concurring Dissenting opinions
opinions votes, opinions opinionsB authoredc
Rehnquist 13 97 1.5 7 21.5
White 15 96 4 8 27
Marshall 12 71 1 20 33
(1990 Term Only)
Blackmun 15.5 77.5 6.5 10.5 27.5
Stevens 13 72 8 25 46
O'Connor 15 92.5 6 8 29
Scalia 11.5 87.5 16.5 13.5 41.5
Kennedy 12 96 8 7.5 27.5
Souter 10.5 95 3.5 3 17
Thomas 9 67 6 7 22
(1991 Term only)
Mean 12.33 86.94 6.39 10.67 29.39
A The number of times a justice voted in the majority (including con-
curring votes).
B Opinions are counted as dissents whether the justice dissented in part
or in whole.
C Majority opions + concurring opinions + dissenting opinions.
II. SCALIA's THEMES WrrHN C w NAL JUSTICE DECISIONS
Scalia has distinguished himself on the Supreme Court by his
consistent reiteration of a number of themes. 2 He has emphasized
strict separation of powers among the branches of government,33
adherence to the text of the Constitution 34 and statutes, 35 and limits
on the number of cases brought before the Supreme Court and other
See Brisbin, supra note 14, at 5-22.
1 See Christopher E. Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Institutions of American
Government, 25 WAKE Fosr L. REv. 783, 788-94 (1990).
34 See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YAME L.J.
1297, 1305-08 (1990).
11 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623-24
(1990).
1992-931
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federal courts.36 Each of these themes has emerged in cases affecting
the criminal justice system.
A. Separation of Powers
According to early analyses of Scalia's decisions as an Associate
Justice, "dedication to the doctrine of separation of powers may be
his strongest present doctrinal commitment, aside from his rejection
of affirmative action. Compromise of his principles on the basic
structure of government under his view of the Constitution is un-
likely."3 7 Scalia has a long history of advocating rigid separation of
powers. As an assistant attorney general in the Ford Administration,
he testified before Congress concerning such issues, and he co-
authored the American Bar Association's amicus brief opposing the
legislative veto.38 He also published articles on the importance of
separation of powers. 39 As a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Scalia was widely
rumored to be the author of the special district court's unsigned per
curiam opinion4O that struck down the automatic budget balancing
provisions in the Graham-Rudman-Holings Act,41 a decision that
was later supported by the Supreme Court. 42 Scalia's fundamental
belief is that in the American Constitutional system, individual rights
and personal liberty are protected not by the Bill of Rights, but
rather by a system of separation of powers that prevents the exces-
sive accumulation of power within any single branch of govern-
ment.43 According to Scalia, "it is the structure of government, its
constitution, in the real sense of that word, that ultimately preserves
or destroys freedom. The Bill of Rights is no more than ink on
paper unless ... it is addressed to a government which is so con-
stituted that no part of it can obtain excessive power." 44
See Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 33, at 794-96, 801-04.
17 Michael Patrick King, Justice Antonin Scalia: The First Term on the Supreme Court
1986-1987, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 67 (1988).
BARBARA HnIsoN CRmAG, CHADSIA: TnE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTmUTONAL STRUGGLE
53-57, 185 (1988).
"See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFoLK U. L. REa. 881 (1983); Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False
Remedy for System Overload, 3 REG. 19 (Nov.-Dec. 1979).
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986).
41 James G. Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions of Judges
Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook, and Winter, 40 U. MAm L. REv. 1171, 1201 (1986).
41 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
41 See Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 33, at 792-94.
" Remarks of Justice Antonin Scalia at Washington, D.C., Panel Discussion on Sepa-
ration of Powers (C-SPAN broadcast, Nov. 15, 1988).
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In the period immediately preceding Scalia's appointment as an
Associate Justice, the Supreme Court had taken a relatively rigid
approach to separation of powers by striking down congressional
legislative veto power over executive branch actions45 and by inval-
idating automatic budget balancing legislation.4 After Scalia's arri-
val, however, the Court adopted a flexible approach to separation
of powers in two criminal justice-related cases. The Court endorsed
the constitutionality of the use of "independent counsel" to inves-
tigate and prosecute misconduct by executive branch officials47 and
approved the authority of the multi-branch U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission, which creates federal sentencing guidelines. 4 The majority
was suddenly willing to permit deviations from strict separation of
powers principles in order to develop mechanisms to address impor-
tant issues.
Scalia was the lone dissenter in both cases, and he issued strident
warnings to his colleagues in his dissenting opinions. 49 Concerning
the office of independent counsel, which deviates from the tradi-
tional practice of placing prosecutorial powers completely under the
control of the executive branch, Scalia wrote: "By its shortsighted
" INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chief Justice Burger declared that "[tihe
Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers ... into three defined categories ... to
assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its
assigned responsibility." Id. at 951.
46 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[n]o one
can doubt that Congress and the President are confronted with fiscal and economic problems
of unprecedented magnitude, but 'the fact a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient,
and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is
contrary to the Constitution."' Id. at 736 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
47 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that:
Notwithstanding the fact that the counsel is to some degree "independent" and
free from Executive supervision to a greater extent than other federal prosecutors,
in our view, these features of the Act [permitting removal by the Attorney
General 'for cause' and making the Attorney General initiate the original ap-
pointment] give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent
counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally
assigned duties.
Id. at 696.
4' Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Justice Blackmun wrote that "[in
this case, the 'practical consequences' of locating the Commission within the Judicial Branch
pose no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the powers
of the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds." Id. at 393.
49 A scholarly analysis of the separation of powers issue labeled Scalia's arguments as
"most subtle and compelling," but ultimately concluded that Scalia's arguments were "not so
weighty as to overcome the burdens of text and history in divining Congress's powers over
government organization." Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power:
A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 596, 624-25 (1989).
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action today, I fear the Court has permanently encumbered the
Republic with an institution that will do it great harm."50 With
regard to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which is comprised of
members from various branches of government, Scalia predicted
that the long-term consequences of the majority's flexible approach
to separation of powers "will be disastrous.1 51
While Scalia adheres to a uniquely rigid view of separation of
powers,5 2 the other justices have demonstrated "pragmatic accep-
tance of innovations, which, despite blurring the lines of authority,
address a difficult problem facing the government. 51 3 On the inde-
pendent counsel issue, the other justices apparently learned from the
Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals that executive branch officials
cannot always be trusted to investigate and prosecute criminal
wrongdoing by their colleagues, especially if the President is impli-
cated in the misdeeds.54 Thus, the governing system needed an
innovation (i.e, independent counsel) to handle this problem because
it was inadequately addressed by existing mechanisms. The Court's
endorsement of the multi-branch sentencing commission may rest
upon the justices' determination that judicial involvement in devel-
oping sentencing guidelines would encourage acceptance and support
by the judges who must implement them. The other justices dem-
onstrated an inclination toward pragmatism by developing innova-
tions designed to address genuine problems in the criminal justice
system: investigation and prosecution of executive branch officials
and equitable, consistent criminal sentencing. Scalia, however, be-
cause of his rigid, principled views, was unwilling to take a pragmatic
approach, even when the governing system had difficulty coping
with specific problems that may require innovative remedies. 55
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
$2 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the
Structure of Government, 1988 Sup. CT. Rav. 1 (analyzing the implications of Scalia's unique
perspective on separation of powers).
" CHRISTOPHER E. SMnrH, PoLIncs IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND QUEsTIONS 12
(1992).
See Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Presidential Pardons and Accountability
in the Executive Branch, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1113 (1989).
11 In regard to the need for an independent counsel, for example, unlike the other
justices, "Justice Scalia erroneously presumes that the voters will always have access to
information about presidential actions [in order to keep the President accountable for a failure
to investigate and prosecute wrongdoing in the executive branch], despite the fact that executive
officials can control the flow of information through their ability to (mis)classify documents
as 'secret."' Id. at 1122.
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B. Textualism
Scalia's rigidity has also been noted in his interpretation of the
Constitution and federal statutes. In statutory interpretation, Scalia
has been labeled the leader of the movement toward "the new
textualism," which "posits that once the Court has ascertained a
statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes
irrelevant."" Although Scalia has yet to persuade a majority of
justices to adopt his views, he is gaining influence and, simultane-
ously, forcing members of Congress to rethink their approach to
creating new statutes. For example, Scalia influenced the develop-
ment of a crime bill in Congress during 1991:
When the House Judiciary Committee was drafting an anti-
crime bill two weeks ago, some members suggested resolving a
dispute by putting compromise language into a committee report,
which accompanies a bill to the floor.
But Barney Frank, D-Mass., warned off his colleagues with
just two words: "Justice Scalia."5 7
Scalia has advanced his textualist approach to statutory inter-
pretation in criminal justice cases as well. For example, in a case
concerning the omission of a precise definition of "burglary" in a
sentence enhancement statute for repeat offenders, Scalia's concur-
ring opinion chided his colleagues for their reliance on legislative
history to determine the statute's meaning: "I can discern no reason
for devoting ten pages of today's [majority] opinion to legislative
history, except to show that we have given this case close and careful
consideration."58
As the following section on constitutional interpretation will
discuss, Scalia's adherence to textualism can appear, at times, to
overcome any conservative predisposition he may possess to decide
cases against defendants.5 9 For example, Scalia's approach to stat-
- Eskridge, supra note 35, at 623.
17 Congress Keeps Eye On Justices As Court Watches Hill's Words, 49 CoNG. Q.
WEaKLY REP. 2863 (Oct. 5, 1991).
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
Justices are predisposed toward particular outcomes because their decisions are heavily
influenced by policy preferences that derive from their attitudes and values: "[P]olicy prefer-
ences almost certainly provide the best explanation for differences among justices in decisional
behavior .... The views of Supreme Court justices on policy issues, of course, derive from
the same general sources as political attitudes generally [e.g., family socialization, schooling,
mass media, and career experiences]." BATm, supra note 13, at 145-46. Justices' policy
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utory interpretation presumably influenced his decision to part com-
pany with fellow conservatives Rehnquist, Souter, White, and
O'Connor and join, without issuing a concurring opinion, a majority
opinion by Justice Marshall stating that the federal sentencing statute
requires judges to notify defendants before departing upward from
the established sentencing range.60 The "pro-defendant" outcome of
the case goes against Scalia's usual decisional pattern, but his inter-
pretation of the statute's text apparently overcame any conservative
inclination to support the federal prosecutors' arguments.
The most significant effect of Scalia's textualism in his criminal
justice decisions has been in the realm of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Scalia does not decide such cases in the manner of the other
conservative justices, who are inclined to balance competing interests
or advance policy preferences in deciding criminal justice cases against
defendants and prisoners. 61 Because Scalia is "[s]olid in his convic-
tion that the text or texts can answer almost every question, he has
not been hesitant to apply his view of their meaning on behalf of
criminal defendants whenever the constitutional language or the
language of authoritative precedent seems to dictate that he do so."' 2
Thus, despite his consistency in deciding criminal justice cases against
the claims of defendants and prisoners, 6 Scalia's textualist approach
to constitutional interpretation has provided the basis for notable
deviations from the decisions of his conservative colleagues.
1. Nonunanimous Decisions in Which Scalia
Joined the Liberals
Although Scalia's general decisional pattern is one of supporting
law enforcement officials and limiting the scope of individual rights,
his adherence to textualism has led him to side with the liberal
justices in a dozen nonunanimous criminal justice cases affecting
preferences in criminal justice cases are discernible in their strategic opinion writing. See
Christopher E. Smith, Bright-Line Rules and the Supreme Court: The Tension Between Clarity
in Legal Doctrine and Justices' Policy Preferences, 16 Omno N.U. L. Rrv. 119, 124-37 (1989).
0Bums v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 2183 (1991).
61 By contrast, for example, in creating a "public safety" exception to the "exclusionary
rule," Rehnquist asserted that "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a
threat to public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657
(1984).
2 Kannar, supra note 34, at 1321.
6 See Table 1, supra p. 193.
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such issues as double jeopardy, 4 right to counsel,6s and self-incrim-
ination. 6 Scalia has been most conspicuous in joining the liberal
justices to support criminal defendants' rights in Confrontation Clause
cases.
a. Confrontation Clause
In Cruz v. New York,67 Scalia, joined by the four most liberal
justices-Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun-wrote the ma-
jority opinion in a Confrontation Clause case that deeply divided
the Court.s Scalia's opinion held that a non-testifying co-defendant's
confession incriminating the defendant is not admissible at their
joint trial. In Coy v. Iowa,69 Scalia, joined by Brennan, White,
Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor in the majority opinion, declared
that a defendant accused of raping two minor girls had his Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights violated by the placement
of a one-way mirror/screen between the defendant and the victims
during the victims' testimonies in court.70 Justice Blackmun's dis-
senting opinion adopted the argument that the Court should balance
competing public policies in attempting to reduce the trauma of
courtroom confrontations for children who are victims of sex crimes.71
Subsequently, when a majority of justices (O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, Blackmun, and White) approved the use of one-way closed
circuit television broadcasts for taking children's testimony during
child sex abuse cases,72 Scalia wrote a dissent, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, which emphasized the clear text of
the Sixth Amendment: "Seldom has this Court failed so conspicu-
ously to sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against
the tide of prevailing current opinion. The Sixth Amendment pro-
6 Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 388 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia joined a
dissent objecting to the Court's holding that respondent's conviction for both robbery and
first degree felony murder on a single offense was not double jeopardy.
6Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 676 (1988) (holding that a suspect who shows
that he wishes to deal with police only through counsel cannot be interrogated about other
offenses).
" Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988). Scalia joined a dissent to the holding
that because collective entities have no Fifth Amendment rights, nor do their employees. Id.
at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
481 U.S. 186 (1987).
" Id. at 187.
487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
7 Id. at 1013.
11 Id. at 1025 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Kannar, supra note 34, at 1329-34.
7 Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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vides, with unmistakable clarity, that '[iln all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.' ' 73
b. Search and Seizure and Due Process
In search and seizure cases, Scalia has generally joined the
conservatives in loosening restrictions on law enforcement officers,
but in two notable cases his textualist approach led him to side with
the liberals in supporting individuals' rights. In National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,74 Scalia joined the dissent of Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens, who objected to the Court's endorse-
ment of drug testing for Customs Service employees when there is
no basis for suspecting them of wrongdoing. In his dissenting opin-
ion, Scalia recognized that the scope of Fourth Amendment rights
has frequently been limited when they are balanced against compet-
ing interests. 75 Thus, Scalia would not require individualized suspi-
cion for drug testing of railroad employees involved in accidents or
for searches of prisoners within correctional institutions. 76 However,
Scalia condemned the Customs Service's drug testing practices as "a
kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic
opposition to drug use." According to Scalia, "Itihe impairment
of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; ...
symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy 4 cause as the abolition
of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable
search.' '78
Similarly, Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the liberal jus-
tices in a five-to-four decision refusing to invoke the "plain view
doctrine' 79 after police officers improperly moved stereo equipment
to look at serial numbers during a warrantless search for weapons
in an apartment from which shots had been fired. 0 In writing that
"there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution some-
times insulates the criminality of the few in order to protect the
7Id. at 3171 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI).
-4 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
71 Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 680 (discussing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989),
decided on the same day as National Treasury Employees' Union).
'n Id. at 681.
79 Id. at 687.
79 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).
"Id. at 323.
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privacy of us all," 8' Scalia rejected the "Burger-style policy analyses"
normally preferred by the conservatives to reach results favoring law
enforcement officials.
During the 1990-91 Term, Scalia joined the three most liberal
justices, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, in opposing the Court's
decision permitting arrestees to be held for up to forty-eight hours
before a probable cause hearing. 3 Scalia's blistering dissent empha-
sized his belief that the "Court's constitutional jurisprudence ...
alternately creates rights that the Constitution does not contain [e.g.,
abortion] and denies rights that it does [e.g., confrontation of
accusing witnesses]."84 According to Scalia, the majority's decision
on jailing suspects "repudiate[s] one of [the Fourth Amendment's]
core applications so that the presumptively innocent may be left in
jail. "85
2. Overall Pattern of Conservatism
The foregoing examples are not intended to alter the generally
accepted classification of Scalia as a consistently conservative mem-
ber of the Supreme Court, as indicated by Scalia's voting pattern
in Table 1.16 Instead, these examples show that Scalia is willing to
deviate from the conservative bloc and, indeed, to criticize his
conservative colleagues sharply, when their policies of deference to
law enforcement officials clash with his notions of clearly stated
rights within the text of the Bill of Rights. Scalia's general pattern
of conservatism can be illustrated by comparing the foregoing ex-
ceptional examples with other cases concerning similar issues in
which Scalia joined the conservatives. For example, despite the few
cases in which Scalia has joined the liberals on search and seizure
issues, he authored the controversial decision that limited Fourth
Amendment rights by endorsing warrantless entry of a home when
the police are given permission to enter by someone whom the
officers reasonably but erroneously believe to possess authority over
the premises.87
81 Id. at 329.
' Kannar, supra note 34, at 1327-28.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1671 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
Id. at 1671.
Id. at 1677.
6See Table 1, supra p. 193.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
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In another example, Scalia joined a liberal decision protecting
defendants from police questioning when they are already repre-
sented by counsel for different pending charges.88 However, Scalia
subsequently joined the conservative majority in a five-to-four de-
cision that refused to give retroactive application to this protection.89
In that case, despite indications from the physical evidence that
some person other than the defendant committed the murder, a
mentally retarded defendant received the death penalty after making
incriminating statements while being improperly questioned by police
outside of the presence of counsel. 90
Even in a case involving the Confrontation Clause, the issue that
appears to bring out Scalia's most consistent disagreements with
conservatives, he indicated that his views were not as broad as those
of the most liberal justices by writing a majority opinion that
permitted the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confes-
sion when the trial court had instructed the jury not to use the
confession against the defendant and edited the confession to remove
references to the defendant. 9
C. Limitations on Access to the Courts
One goal advanced by Scalia is to reduce the number of cases
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts. In his
first major address to the American Bar Association after his ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court, Scalia bemoaned the "continuing
deterioration" of the federal judiciary caused by excessive caseload
burdens.Y He argued that the federal judiciary was intended to be
a "natural aristocracy ... of ability rather than wealth." 93 Scalia
proposed that specialized courts be created to handle specific cate-
gories of cases, such as Social Security disability appeals, in order
to divert these cases from the federal court system 4 His desire to
reduce litigants' access to the federal courts is also reflected in his
" Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
"See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
"A scientific analysis of pubic hair found on the rape-murder victim's body indicated
that it did not come from the man convicted and sentenced to death for the crime. See Ruth
Marcus, Waiting Forever on Death Row, WASH. PosT NAT'L W'cY ED., June 18-24, 1990,
at 11-12.
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
See Stuart Taylor, Scalia Proposes Major Overhaul of the U.S. Courts, N.Y. Tmms,
Feb. 16, 1987, at 1.
93 Id.
91 Id. at 12.
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emphasis on various jurisdictional devices to limit the number of
cases brought before the federal judiciary. Thus, for example, "Scalia
champions the doctrine of standing as a way of restricting [the
number of cases eligible for federal judicial action]." 95
In criminal justice cases, Scalia has been a consistent supporter
of the recent decisions that have limited the opportunities for con-
victed offenders to file appeals and habeas corpus petitions. For
example, Scalia joined the other conservatives to deny a right to
counsel for death row inmates seeking to file habeas corpus peti-
tions,96 require that claims be raised in the initial petition even when
relevant information about those claims is improperly hidden by
state officials at the time that the first petition is ffled, 97 and declare
that violations of state procedural rules, even when committed
through an attorney's error, deprive prisoners of any opportunity
to raise claims in federal habeas petitions. 98 Scalia also authored a
1991 decision that refused to lift a state procedural bar to raising
claims on a federal habeas petition. 99 These decisions are part of the
conservatives' effort to create new rules governing habeas corpus by
judicial action after Chief Justice Rehnquist failed in his efforts to
have similar changes enacted legislatively by Congress.1°°
On his own, Scalia has acted to reduce the Supreme Court's
burden of death penalty appeals. Before 1991, Justice White was
the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, covering
Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi-states that apply the death pen-
" Brisbin, supra note 14, at 7.
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
" Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
"Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991).
1w [Chief Justice] Rehnquist appointed a committee headed by retired Justice
Lewis Powell to propose reforms for the processing of appeals in capital cases.
Rehnquist subsequently submitted the proposals for consideration by the Judicial
Conference of the United States.... At its September 1989 meeting, the judges
on the Judicial Conference decided to defer judgment on the proposals until
their March 1990 meeting in order to discuss the proposals more fully with the
other judges in their home circuits. After the September meeting, Rehnquist
forwarded the proposals to Congress on behalf of the judiciary without waiting
for discussion and endorsement by the other members of the Judicial Confer-
ene .... Subsequently, at its March meeting, the Judicial Conference rejected
Rehnquist's favored reforms and forwarded an alternative proposal to Congress
which did not place such strict limits on opportunities for death row inmates to
contest their convictions.
SmrrH, PoLmcs IN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw, supra note 53, at 94-95. See also David G. Savage,
Virginian Nears Execution Despite Doubt Against Guilt, L.A. Tas, May 13, 1992, at Al.
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alty more often than most. 10 1 White routinely granted extensions to
the 90-day filing deadline for death row inmates who did, not have
attorneys to prepare their submissions for Supreme Court review.102
In February of 1991, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist shuffled the
justices' circuit responsibilities and made Scalia the Circuit Justice
overseeing the Fifth Circuit. Scalia immediately announced that he
would not give extensions for the filing deadlines, even for prisoners
who lacked professional assistance and thus were forced to represent
themselves in seeking Supreme Court review. 103 Because indigent
prisoners are often incapable of adequately representing themselves
because of illiteracy, learning disabilities, limited education, psycho-
logical problems, and the inherent complexity of legal research and
the judicial process,10 Scalia's efforts to limit the flow of cases may
produce especially harsh consequences for some prisoners who might
otherwise assert claims that are worthy of review.
III. NOTABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISIONS AND OPINIONS
A. Majority Opinions
Scalia has written a number of opinions that helped to shape
important developments in the Supreme Court's determination of
criminal justice issues. In regard to the death penalty, Scalia was
influential in determining whether convicted offenders could be ex-
ecuted for crimes committed while they were juveniles. When the
Supreme Court narrowly decided that an offender could not be
executed for a murder committed while he was only fifteen years of
age,105 Scalia dissented and declared that individualized consideration
of the offender's maturity and culpability rather than chronological
age should determine whether the death penalty is applicable.1c6
Subsequently, Scalia wrote the Court's opinion in Stanford v. Ken-
",' See U.S. Death-Row Population, FACTS ON FIE WORLD NEws DIoST, Apr. 23, 1992,
at 289, col. A3.
i- Linda Greenhouse, Scalia Tightens Policy on Death Penalty Appeals, N.Y. Thmss,
Feb. 22, 1991, at B16.
1w Id.
104 For example, more than half of the prisoners in Florida's prisons were found to read
at or below the sixth grade level. See Christopher E. Smith, Examining the Boundaries of
Bounds: Prison Law Libraries and Access to the Courts, 30 How. L.J. 27, 34-35 (1987) (citing
Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1338-44 (M.D. Fla. 1982)).
"I Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
116 Id. at 858 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tucky, °7 which declared that imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed at age sixteen or seventeen did not violate the
Eighth Amendment.'0 The dissenters noted, however, that one of
the juveniles whose death sentence was at issue waived his right to
counsel, presented no mitigating evidence, and was found incom-
petent to waive his rights by a state-appointed forensic psychiatrist,
and thus did not actually fit Scalia's supposed criteria of individu-
alized evaluation in being "mature and culpable beyond his years."' 9
These opinions by Scalia were characteristic of his strong and con-
sistent support for deference to state officials concerning the appli-
cation of the death penalty.
Scalia also authored the majority opinion in Wilson v. Seiter,110
which drastically changed the judicial standard of review for prison-
ers' civil rights cases." In cases challenging conditions of confine-
ment in correctional institutions as violating the Eighth Amendment,
the Supreme Court initially endorsed judicial intervention when an
examination of the "totality of conditions" revealed "wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain" or "unquestioned and serious dep-
rivation of basic human needs."" 2 In other words, judges were to
apply an objective standard and order remedies if prison conditions
did not meet the standards of the Eighth Amendment. Scalia's 1991
opinion in Wilson, however, indicated that cases challenging con-
ditions of confinement were to receive judicial remedies only when
there was "deliberate indifference" on the part of corrections offi-
cials."' Thus, the courts will no longer look at the conditions of
confinement objectively to determine whether they meet Eighth
Amendment standards. Instead, they will examine the state of mind
of corrections officials subjectively to determine whether remedies
are appropriate. As a result of this drastic change in standards, it
now may be possible for a prison unfit for human habitation to
avoid judicial intervention and remedial action even if the correc-
tional administrator is aware of the deficiency. "We are aware and
concerned about the conditions," the official might say, "but we
-- 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
'0 Id. at 364.
0 Id. at 399-401 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Io 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
"2 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
"I I S. Ct. at 2323.
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simply do not have enough money to correct the problems," thus
showing that there is no "deliberate indifference.""14
In Harmelin v. Michigan,"5 Scalia's majority opinion declared
that a Michigan law mandating a life sentence without possibility of
parole for carrying more than 650 grams of cocaine did not violate
the Eighth Amendment." 6 The four dissenters (White, Blackmun,
Marshall, Stevens) complained that Scalia's analysis obliterated the
proportionality requirement that had previously been considered part
of the Eighth Amendment. According to Justice White's dissent,
Scalia's reasoning would endorse a state's decision to mandate life
imprisonment for parking tickets." 7 Unless the proportionality re-
quirement of the Eighth Amendment is clarified in subsequent cases,
Scalia's opinion may give states greater freedom to punish any crime
in nearly any manner.
B. Influence over Important Decisions
Scalia's dissenting opinions in 1987118 and 1989"9 against Court
decisions that narrowly precluded the use of victim impact statements
in death penalty trials probably helped to lay the groundwork for
the Supreme Court's 1991 decision endorsing the use of such state-
ments. 120 Scalia noted, with candor unusual for a judicial officer,
that many precedents cannot be overturned until the composition of
the Court changes: "[O]verrulings of precedent rarely occur without
a change in the Court's personnel.' ' 2' Despite Scalia's expressed
concerns that the judiciary not be regarded as a political branch of
government, 122 his statement constituted a clear acknowledgement of
the underlying political influences upon the definition of constitu-
tional law (i.e., new appointees who change the Court's political
and ideological composition).
Scalia provided a key vote in Arizona v. Fulminante'23 by joining
a majority of justices in holding that a prisoner's confession to an
"1 See id. at 2330 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (warning that, under the majority
opinion, "prison officials will be able to defeat a § 1983 action challenging inhumane prison.
conditions simply by showing that the conditions are caused by insufficient funding").
I' 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
,16 Id. at 2699.
17 Id. at 2709 (White, J., dissenting).
" Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
-' South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
110 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
,21 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 823 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'= See Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 33, at 796-99.
111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). I'l
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undercover police officer posing as a prisoner was "coerced" be-
cause the confession was given in exchange for a promise of protec-
tion when the prisoner feared for his safetyYl ' Scalia then switched
his vote to create a different five-member majority for a decision
on a separate issue within the case that the admission into testimony
of coerced and therefore involuntary confessions may sometimes be
considered "harmless error" immune from reversal on appeal.' 5
This dramatic change in the harmless-error doctrine as applied to
involuntary confessions may foreshadow future decisions in which
the conservative justices declare other improper procedures to be
"harmless."6
C. Intracourt Conflict
Although the foregoing examples illustrate Scalia's influence over
the development of judicial decisions affecting criminal justice issues,
one other opinion is notable rather than influential. Scholars have
noted that the justices need to work together in order to form stable
coalitions that will decide' issues in a consistent manner: "No matter
how great their isolation from each other, justices have incentives
to interact and work together on decisions.... In order to retain
or expand [a] majority, [a justice] often is willing to change language
to satisfy [other justices]."' 27 Scalia is distinctive among the justices
for his manifest unwillingness to compromise. As one observer
noted, "[r]ather than bend or compromise in the interest of forging
a majority, Scalia seems content to lob verbal grenades from the
sidelines."'' 2 Thus, Scalia has gained a reputation for attacking other
justices vigorously in his opinions through sarcasm, ridicule, and
cataclysmic warnings of doom. 129 Scalia chose a 1990 criminal justice
224 Id. at 1249.
12 Id. at 1261.
'16 See id. at 1257 ("mhe majority offers no convincing reason for overturning our long
line of decisions requiring the exclusion of coerced confessions[,] ... [but] it becomes necessary
to evaluate under that ruling the admissibility of [the coerced confession at issue].").
22 BAUM, supra note 13, at 159.
2 Tony Mauro, High Court Adjourns for Summer Intact, LEGAL Ta, s, July 9, 1990,
at 10.
229 See Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 33, at 804-09. For example, in the
"right-to-die" case concerning the request of parents to remove their comatose daughter from
life-support systems, Scalia condemned his eight colleagues for recognizing a due process right
to refuse medical treatment. Scalia said that the other justices would "destroy" the Supreme
Court by involving it in complex moral issues. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110
S. Ct. 2841, 2863 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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case 30 to launch a sarcastic and unsettling attack against Justice
Marshall and, presumably, the other liberal justices whom Scalia
apparently views as hyper-sensitive about issues of racial discrimi-
nation. 3 ' Scalia's majority opinion rejected a white defendant's Sixth
Amendment "fair cross section" claim against a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude African-American jurors.3 2 In dis-
concertingly strong language, Scalia rejected Justice Marshall's con-
cerns about the risks of racial discrimination: "Justice Marshall's
dissent rolls out the ultimate weapon, the accusation of insensitivity
to racial discrimination-which will lose its intimidating effect if it
continues to be fired so randomly."'3 Scalia's statement clearly
implied that concerns about racial discrimination are raised too
frequently and in unwarranted situations, and that such claims have
intimidated justices into voting in certain ways in order to avoid
being labeled as 'racists.' This was a very strong statement, especially
when considered in light of its target, the one justice who was
personally victimized by racial discrimination in a segregated society
and even attacked by a lynch mob because of the color of his skin.Y4
'" See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
See id. at 486.
"id. at 475.
" Id. at 486.
The incident was described by Thurgood Marshall and Carl Rowan during a television
special on Marshall's life and career:
Rowan: Thurgood Marshall had a close brush with death in 1946 when he went
to Columbia, Tennessee, to defend two black men who were charged with crimes
in connection with race riots.
Marshall: The mob followed me out [a]cross Duck River and pulled us over
and the mob was a very interesting mob. It was composed equally of state
troopers and city police. And they said they had a warrant to search the car
and I said, "Go right ahead." And then I told the guy with me, I said, "Hey,
let's watch him, don't let him put some liquor in there," [be]cause it was a dry
county.
Rowan: The posse took Marshall near the banks of the river, ordering the other
blacks to go into town. As Marshall neared the river, he saw people waiting for
the "party."
By "party" you mean "lynch party"?
Marshall: Lynch party! Or something, I don't know.
Rowan: But the other Black lawyers refused to go into Columbia, and the mob
leaders decided there could be no hanging that day. Instead, they charged
Thurgood Marshall with drunk driving.
Thurgood Marshall the Man, (WUSA-TV, Washington, D.C., television broadcast, Dec. 13,
1987) (transcript on file with the Kentucky Law Journal).
See also SssrrH, PoLmcs IN CoNsrrnboNAL LAW, supra note 53, at 167 ("Among
members of the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall's life experiences gave him unique exposure
to the problems of racial discrimination .... [H]e was the only justice to grow up as a
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Scalia's views on the substantive legal issue were ultimately rejected
by a substantial majority of justices (Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter,
Stevens, Marshall, Blackmun, White), who decided in 1991, over
the dissents of Scalia and Rehnquist, that the Equal Protection
Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment serves as the basis for
protecting against racially exclusionary peremptory challenges, even
against jurors of a different race than the defendant.'35 However,
the appearance of Scalia's strong language in the 1990 case in an
opinion joined by four other justices (Rehnquist, White, O'Connor,
Kennedy) provided a strong indication of the emerging conservative
majority's drastically different viewpoints and sensitivities on civil
rights issues.
CONCLUSION
Although criminal justice cases have not been a primary area of
emphasis in the judicial opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia, such
cases provide examples of the persistent themes that appear in
Scalia's decisions. Although he is one of the most consistent con-
servative votes against assertions of rights by criminal defendants
and prisoners, Scalia has parted company with his conservative
colleagues in several cases in which his textualist approach to judicial
interpretation has led him to agree with outcomes favored by more
liberal justices. Scalia has not received an equal share of opinion
assignments in criminal justice cases, but he has managed to influ-
ence developments concerning a number of important issues. His
future actions bear watching because it appears that he will be a
powerful and articulate voice on the Supreme Court for decades to
come. In addition, because Justice Thomas appears to decide cases
in much the same manner as Scalia, 136 there is speculation that Scalia
is having a direct influence over the youngest, least experienced, and
potentially longest serving justice among the conservatives on the
victimized minority group member in a segregated Southern border state (Maryland); the only
justice to be dragged from his car at night toward a tree with a noose by a lynch mob ...;
the only justice to travel throughout the segregated South representing victims in race discrim-
ination cases ....").
"I See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
116 See The Justices Scold Thomas, Tmm, Mar. 9, 1992, at 31 ("Thomas has voted with
Scalia, the most conservative member of the high bench, in each of the 13 cases [Thomas]
has participated in this term.").
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contemporary Court.17 Scalia's influence over future decisions may
thus extend beyond the unique imprint of his strident opinions on
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.
'" Clarence Thomas vowed to "bring something different" to the Supreme Court,
but in four months on the bench he has asked few questions in oral argument
and voted in all but one case with conservative Justice Antonin Scalia. The
alliance is understandable. Not only is Scalia an aggressive and articulate pros-
elytizer but one of his former law clerks now works for Thomas. The clerk,
NEWSWEEK has learned, exerts considerable influence over the rookie justice.
Last week, for example, in a dissent that drew an unusual rebuke from
the seven-member court majority in a prison case, Scalia joined Thomas in
declaring that beating a manacled prisoner may not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. "Thomas and Scalia are
one person with two votes," complains Bob Peck of the American Civil Liberties
Union. And court observers have even given them a nickname: The D.C. Duo.
Thomas: Hypocritic Oath?, Nawswnmx, Mar. 9, 1992, at 6.
See also Linda Greenhouse, Unusual Use of First Amendment Overturns a Killer's Death
Sentence, N.Y. TMs, Mar. 10, 1992, at A14 ("Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion [in
Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992)] was notable for the solitary position in which
it placed him, without even the company of his apparent mentor, Justice Antonin Scalia....
[Dawson, concerning a jury's consideration of the defendant's rembership in the Aryan
Brotherhood during death penalty sentencing proceedings] was the first case that found Justices
Thomas and Scalia on opposite sides.").
[VoL. 81
